While
much attention has been devoted to the alleged failure of
post-communist transformation to generate popular protests in Eastern
Europe, less attention has been paid to the exploration of existing
examples of disruptive social contention in the region. This paper
examines one of the most militant and prolonged cases of protest in
Eastern Europe - the Donbas miners’ movement in Ukraine. The miners
have succeeded in influencing the state and governing authorities by
the means of contentious collective action. The miners’ movement
has, nevertheless, failed to achieve its aims. This paper argues that
it is the specific dynamics of contentious politics under
post-communism rather than the lack of violent protest that explains
the failure of the miners’ social movement.
By:
Vlad Mykhnenko
Faculty
of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cambridge
e-mail:
vm222@cam.ac.uk
Paper
for the Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference 10-13
April 2000, London
*
* *
“Why
did Central and Eastern Europeans protest less about the brutal
social conditions of systemic change than the people of Latin America
had a decade earlier? How did it happen that less disruptive forms of
protest emerged as dominant social responses to economic grievances?”
asks a recently published volume on patience in post-communist
societies (Greskovits 1998). Leaving the book’s answer aside, one
might ask, alternatively, what happened when Eastern Europeans did
protest? How have their opponents reacted to disruptive rather than
“stabilising” forms of protest? Are we really witnessing the
birth of civil society where “it is not clear who is boss”
(Gellner 1996) or the old boss is still in place?
To
initiate a discussion vis-à-vis the problems above, this paper
focuses on one of the most militant examples of post-communist
contentious politics – the movement of the Donbas miners in
Ukraine. This social movement was born in 1989, when over 500,000
Soviet miners went on strike. The miners’ action soon became a
symbol of the emerging civil society – that is, a group or mass of
people who can check and counterbalance the state (Gellner 1996). In
the “hot summer” of 1989, the Communist party capitulated to the
triumphant miners. The Soviet state collapsed soon afterwards. Yet
ten years after their victory, the spirit of depression has hovered
over the Donbas miners.
Notwithstanding
the justice of their cause and countless waves of disruptive protest,
the Donbas miners have failed to achieve their goal. The miners’
movement did challenge the state. Nevertheless, the outcome of this
challenge has lagged far behind the expectations generated after the
miners’ symbolic victory in 1989. The aim of this paper is
therefore to understand why this might be the case. This paper will
examine first the basic properties of the Donbas miners’ movement,
before turning to the evolution of its contentious politics. This
paper will then consider possible explanations for the apparent
failure of the miners’ movement. In the conclusion, this paper will
discuss the relative weight of the state, the polity and civil
society under post-communism. It is argued that the dynamics of
contentious politics rather than the alleged patience or apathy of
Eastern Europeans provide a better insight into the absence of
widespread popular unrest under post-communism.
Donbas
miners’ movement
Basic
properties
Social
movements are defined by Tarrow as “collective challenges, based on
common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction
with elites, opponents, and authorities” (1998: 4). Such a
sustained interaction leads to shifts within movements and to changes
in their basic characteristics. Therefore, before moving towards the
interaction generated by the Donbas miners, we should briefly examine
the historical and socio-economic context of their movement at its
initial stage, that is, before the movement was actually born in the
sequences of contention. Following the concept of della Porta and
Diani (1999: 14-16), four characteristic aspects of the miners’
movement need special attention: (1) informal interaction networks,
(2) shared beliefs and solidarity, (3) collective action focusing on
conflicts, (4) use of protest.
Historical
environment and informal networks
The
initial development of the Donbas was similar to that of the Ruhr
area in Germany or Upper Silesia in Poland. The industrialisation of
the region began after the discovery of hard coal. As early as 1917,
the Donbas was producing 87 percent of the Russian Empire’s coal
output, 76 percent of pig iron, 57 percent of steel and more than 90
percent of coke (Afonin 1990: 45). After the Bolshevik revolution and
Stalin’s industrialisation, the Donbas remained the largest
producing area of coal, iron and steel in Ukraine and one of the
world’s major metallurgical and heavy-industrial complexes (see
Table 1).
For
centuries, the area of the Donbas was an empty field. Industrial
revolution and Stalin’s Great Terror opened the region to massive
migration. People were attracted to the Donbas by the region’s vast
employment opportunities as much as by its image of a “safe haven
for fugitives” (Kuromiya 1998). The Donbas eventually became a
highly urbanised and densely populated “melting pot” of various
ethno-linguistic groups.2 Nonetheless, over 98 percent of Donbas
inhabitants recognise Russian or Ukrainian as their mother tongues
(Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1993a: 32-3; 44-5). Donbas population of
about 8.2 million people is an overlapping mixture of ethnic
Ukrainians (51 percent) and ethnic Russians (44 percent) (Goskomstat
SSSR 1991: 80, 82). Due to the prolonged powerlessness of the
Ukrainian cultural tradition, over four-fifths of the Donbas
population are Russian speakers (Smith and Wilson 1997: 847,
854-864). Therefore, the region has been widely regarded as the
Eastern pole in a cultural identity cleavage claimed to divide the
country along the “Western Ukraine - Eastern Ukraine”
ethno-linguistic, religious, economic and historical axis (Wilson
1993; Birch and Zinko 1996; Solchanyk 1994; Wilson 1995; Arel and
Khmelko 1996; Smith and Wilson 1997; Shulman 1999).
Another
particular feature of the Donbas is its social-class structure. In
general, the region has been a base for over 23 percent of Ukraine’s
industrial labour force. During the 1989 Soviet census, 70 percent of
the Donbas inhabitants were classified as working-class (workers); a
quarter of the population were identified as white-collar personnel
(public servants); and only 5 percent were classified as peasants
(collective farmers) (Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1993b: 16).
Coal
mining accounted for 21 percent of the region’s industrial output
(Heohrafichna entsyklopediia Ukraïny 1989: 355). In 1989, about 35
percent of the Donbas industrial labour force were employed by 254
coal mines and mining-related firms (Zastavnyi 1990: 262; Reshetilova
et al. 1997: 5). Working in extremely dangerous conditions, the
Donbas miners developed close informal networks of reliance and
socialisation. Common cultural traditions facilitated the extension
of miners’ informal interaction networks beyond their working
place. In general, the informal ties observed among the Donbas miners
are similar to those that used to exist among coal miners and their
communities in other parts of the world (on coal mining communities
and networks see Samuel 1977; Dix 1988; Warwick and Littlejohn 1992;
Carswell and Roberts 1992).
Shared
beliefs and solidarity
The
main belief shared by the Donbas miners was based on the materialist
understanding of their work (Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995;
Seigelbaum 1997: 13-14). In particular, they believed in the Marxian
labour theory of value, where the quantity of labour used up in the
manufacture of a product determines its real, fundamental and
immutable value. With the beginning of democratisation in the USSR,
the miners’ belief was increasingly related to a feeling of social
injustice:
The
problem, according to many miners, was that people were not getting
paid according to their labour: those that worked hard, and produced
something of material value, were being cheated out of its worth,
while those that distributed this wealth, were enriching themselves
without real work. The miners soon drew a connection between their
sense of exploitation and the state’s ability, through the
self-appointed communist party, to distribute wealth as it saw fit.
Indeed, the class-based anger directed at managers within the
enterprise was soon aimed towards a system the miners believed to be
exploiting them (Crowley 1995: 59).
“Every
worker feeds five to seven managers,” one miner remarked in 1989.
“We are Negros under slavery! There is no respect for us. No one
listens to our demands!” (Kostiukovskii 1990: 63-64).
The
perception of social injustice and exploitation prevalent among the
miners was fostered by horrifically unsafe working conditions. In
1988, 80 percent of the Ukrainian coal mines were over 40 years old
(Reshetilova et al. 1997: 103). Eighty-seven percent of collieries in
the Donbas were more than 800 metres below the surface with
temperatures exceeding 30°C. Over 20,000 miners were working even
deeper underground under extreme heat pressures. The share of manual
labour in coal production exceeded 57 percent (Rusnachenko 1993: 66).
The
fatality rate in the Donbas coal industry became the highest in the
world (BBC, 12 March 2000). In the late 1980s, there were four deaths
and six serious injuries for every one million ton of coal mined in
the region (Sarzhan 1998: 163). In the 1990s, one miner was killed at
work every day (Table 2). At some mines the fatality rate was 15 to
20 deaths for every one million ton of coal (Burnosov 1995: 29; 31).
Given the persistent underinvestments into the industry, the number
of industrial accidents has been growing (Rusnachenko 1993: 66. For
comparisons see Siegelbaum 1997: 23). A deep feeling of social
injustice and exploitation, the hazardous working conditions,
combined with a much-celebrated heroic image of miners, resulted in a
strong sense of occupational solidarity.
Conflictual
issues
Despite
celebrating miners as “quintessential proletarians”, state
socialism was unable to adequately compensate them for their hard
labour and human losses. In terms of monetary gratification, the
miners were among the best-paid professions in the USSR since World
War II (Friedgut and Siegelbaum 1990: 2; Seigelbaum 1997: 5).
Underground workers were also provided with fairly high pensions as
early as the age of fifty. Nevertheless, few miners have been able to
reach the pension age. In the early 1990s, the average life
expectancy for the main coal mining occupations was about
thirty-eight years (Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995: 121-122). Being
paid officially for a six-hour working day, miners worked, in fact,
for ten to eleven and sometimes even sixteen hours a day (Rusnachenko
1993: 67). A large number of coal workers were not provided with
appropriate housing accommodation and lived in poor sanitary
conditions. The predominance of “smoke-stack” industries in a
highly urbanised area led to large-scale environmental devastation.
Moreover, with the beginning of perestroika, food and goods shortages
became widespread and queues appeared to be endless. The lack of
consumer goods, according to one 1989 survey, headed the list of
miners’ grievances (Rusnachenko 1993: 66-67; Friedgut and
Siegelbaum 1990: 14-16). A labour conflict was emerging:
Working
deep below the surface, where temperatures and concentrations of
methane gas were high, and frequently compelled to use “grandpa’s
methods” (that is, jack hammers and shovels) to extract coal,
Donbas workers had the distinct sense that “Moscow” did not care
how much hard labour they expended or how many lives were sacrificed
in the process (1997: 5-6).
Use
of protest
Della
Porta and Diani have suggested that protest reflects a view of
politics as a power struggle, in which involvement in civil society
is not limited to elections (1999: 176). The participation in
elections did not provide citizens under state socialism with a
possibility to influence political decision-making in the country.
Protest, thus, was the only resource for politically impoverished
miners.
The
main purpose of the emerging contention was miners’ endeavour to
obtain “normal” or “civilised life”. According to some
observers, what the miners call “normal life” is Western or
American(ised) mass media, video or billboard images of affluence
ranging “from Disneyland to Pittsburgh” (Walkowitz 1995: 160,
174, 176; Siegelbaum 1997: 13). To be sure, there never was a
coherent picture of what may constitute a “normal life”. Some
naïveté with regard to the “civilised West” has existed among
various social groups in Ukraine and other post- communist countries.
Nevertheless, the hazardous situation in the Donbas coal industry has
made it simple what can be regarded as reasonable living and working
conditions:
People
live to be just thirty-eight years old ... [But] people’s dreams
are different. My kids dream of being able to live in an apartment,
in normal conditions […] We want our kids to live like human
beings. We don’t want luxuries or excesses, just to have some
certainty about tomorrow. We want people to lead normal lives, to
have acceptable, decent working conditions. This is all we are
striving for. We don’t want anything else (interview with Donets’k
City strike committee, committee, May 1991, in Siegelbaum and
Walkowitz 1995: 122).
The
opportunity to work and earn money was considered to be among the
main elements of the “normal life” (interview with the Samofalov
family, 1992, in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995: 194). In turn, the
achievement of “normal life” was never restricted to saving jobs
in the declining coal industry:
[T]he
miners pay for their wages with their blood […] We don’t advocate
preserving the coal enterprises of the Donba[s] at any cost […] We
object to miners working in those dangerous zones. We would agree to
close down the mines, but the people who work there should have the
opportunity to be retrained so that they could work in some other
industry. What we won’t agree to, is that all the mines should be
closed down and all the miners become unemployed (interview with
Yurii Makarov, 1992, in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995: 145).
Working-class
discontent in the Donbas became apparent at the early stage of
Gorbachev’s perestroika, democratisation and glasnost’. In
1987-1988, there were several local collective actions, “refusals
to work” and hunger strikes at some Donbas enterprises (Burnosov
1995: 29). In 1988, a central newspaper of the official all-Ukrainian
Trade Unions published workers’ complaints about the lack of any
economic progression at their enterprises (Kuzio and Wilson 1994:
105). By the spring of 1989, the miners’ contentious action has
included about twelve brief local strikes and hundreds of telegrams,
letters and petitions demanding enterprise independence and higher
wages (Rusnachenko 1993: 68). During a visit to Donets’k in June
1989, Gorbachev himself was warned about miners’ discontent
(Friedgut and Siegelbaum 1990: 8). All the warnings appeared to be
unsuccessful.
Cycles
of contention
By
the late 1980s, the Donbas miners had acquired all the basic
components needed for a collective contentious action. Miners
perceived state socialism - “the system” - as their collective
challenge. They recognised the existence of exploitation as their
shared belief and the strive for the “normal life” as their
common purpose. Oppressive working conditions, high levels of
occupational density as well as existing rituals of celebrating “the
heroes of labour” forged the miners’ solidarity.
Mobilisation:
1989-1991
The
first wave of contention materialised in the summer strike of 1989.
The strike started at a single mine in the Kuzbass3 city of
Mezhdurechensk. From Siberia, industrial action expanded to all other
coalfields in the Soviet Union. In the Donbas, the strike was
initiated on 15 July 1989 also by a single mine. Soon, 173 out of 226
Donbas collieries went on strike. The overall Kuznets Coal Basin
(byname Kuzbass) is located in southwestern Siberia.
Demands
of the miners were articulated by openly elected mine and city strike
committees. The strike was triggered by frustrated expectations,
arbitrariness of authorities, lawlessness and anxiety that
perestroika was passing the miners by with no improvement in living
standards (Friedgut and Siegelbaum 1990: 13; see also Zabastovka
1989: 95; Kostiukovskii 1990). A sociological survey conducted among
the striking Donbas miners reported that:
people
were tired of waiting for promises to be fulfilled, that they had
felt freed from ‘serfdom’ by glastnost’, that fear had
vanished, thinking awakened, and that the media had encouraged a
popular rejection of the bureaucracy. Significantly, 50 per cent of
respondents added that professional solidarity played a part in their
motivation (as cited in Friedgut and Siegelbaum 1990: 13-14).
The
emphasis of the miners was put on economic demands. The most radical
among them was for full economic and legal autonomy of mining
enterprises. The miners also demanded improvements in pay, vacation,
pension, work, housing and various welfare conditions. Some strike
committees succeeded in purging mine management as well as Party and
municipal officials. Nevertheless, the miners produced mainly
economic, welfare-related demands and not anti-communist slogans. To
make their demands publicly justified, the miners rebuffed
“outsiders,” the emissaries of intelligentsia opposition groups
from Kiev and Western Ukraine, who had tried to turn the strike into
a political struggle for Ukrainian independence.
Most
observers have stressed that the Party line was against the strike
(Friedgut and Siegelbaum 1990: 22-23; Rusnachenko 1993: 73). Local
authorities and some mine managers tried to stop the spread of the
strike around the region by threatening and provoking the workers.
Although the majority of the region’s population fully supported
the miners’ action, the public opinion constructed by central mass
media considered the miners as being already “over-privileged”
and selfish. The miners’ demands were satisfied only after Mikhail
Gorbachev supported them in several public statements (Burnosov 1995:
32; see also Zabastovka 1989: 5-11). The miners also received the
widely publicised support from Boris El’tsin and members of the
USSR Supreme Soviet elected from the Donbas (see Zabastovka 1989: 22,
95). The 1989 strike produced an emerging sense of civic empowerment:
In
every sphere, the conviction grew that the worker should have a
direct and clear input into the political system, and that the old
system that had proved so corrupt and hypocritical must be radically
changed (Friedgut and Siegelbaum 1990: 19).
The
civic competence of the miners grew further with the gradual decline
of central authorities and de-legitimisation of Gorbachev reforms.
The Donbas miners did not dissolve their strike committees, which
were transformed into standing institutions. Further
institutionalisation and radicalisation of the miners’ movement
followed the 1989 strike. The strike commentators predicted, however,
that “unless miners forge links with workers in other industries
and further develop their new-found sense of civic competence, they
will be outmanoeuvred by the forces of rationalisation, and their
victory will have been short-lived” (Friedgut and Siegelbaum
1990:32).
To
initiate co-operation with Ukrainian intelligentsia, shortly after
the July 1989 strike, a delegation of Donbas miners attended the
inaugural congress of the Ukrainian Popular Movement, Rukh. The
delegation openly declared their struggle to be not purely economic
but also political. The lack of understanding between workers and
national intelligentsia was said to be caused by the “divide and
rule” policy of the Communist party-controlled media (Kuzio and
Wilson 1994: 106). “We drank before, they pushed bottles in front
of us. Enough!” said one of the miners. “We need to learn.
Organise us lectures. Only not “schools of young Communists” –
we need legal, economic and political knowledge” (Ibid: 105).
No
“lectures” were organised. Nevertheless, the miners’ movement
was drifting to the open disapproval of the Communist party rule. The
First and the Second All-Union Congresses of Miners, held in Donets’k
in June and October 1990 respectively, became political rather than
trade-unionist events. Resolutions adopted by the First Congress
accused the Communist party and the central government of blocking
transition to market and democracy (Burnosov 1995: 41-42). The miners
called for the resignation of the Soviet government and organised
several strikes and rallies to support their political demands. In
July 1990, about 256 mining, steel and transport enterprises hold
one-day political strike supporting the resolutions of the congress
(Sarzhan 1998: 167). Donbas miners began to withdraw from the
Communist party en masse.
During
the Second Congress, activists of the movement declared a need for
establishing an independent miners’ trade union (Burnosov 1995:
42-43). With regard to the principles of a new economy, twenty six
percent of delegates at the Second Miners’ Congress stated a
preference for a “free market” economy, while 60 percent opted
for a “regulated market.” Preferences for “centralised planned
economy” and “basically centralised planned economy with some
elements of market relations” were chosen only by 6 percent of
delegates (Crowley and Siegelbaum 1995: 65). The Second Congress laid
down the basis for the establishment of the Independent Miners’
Union as an organisation aimed at defending the economic and social
rights of miners. In turn, standing strike committees took upon
themselves all the “dirty” political work (interview with Mikhail
Krylov, 1992, in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995: 150).
In
March-April 1991, the standing strike committees began to fulfill
their function by holding the second all-Union miners’ strike. This
time the miners called openly for the resignation of Gorbachev and
the central government, the dismantling the Soviet parliament and for
granting constitutional status to the Ukrainian Declaration of
Sovereignty (Siegelbaum 1997: 10; Sarzhan 1998: 168). The Donbas
miners did not wary of provoking repression since the weakness of the
Soviet state had long become apparent. The participation in the
strike by individual mines was not as representative as in 1989
(Burnosov 1995: 44). Moreover, the strike demands were not supported
by other groups of workers. As Crowley has indicated, other workers
could not join the Donbas miners for the prevalence of enterprise
paternalism (1995). All post-Soviet workers heavily depended on their
enterprises for the distribution of social goods, benefits and
privileges. However, it was other industries with their large
multifunctional plants and not coal pits that possessed a greater
social infrastructure. Social grievances appeared to be more
widespread among the coal miners than anybody else. And it was the
miners who did not have much to lose in their contention with
authorities. Thus, the radicalism of the miners’ movement was
unable to attract a broad working-class support.
Notwithstanding,
the mass media had no restrictions on publicising the 1991 strike and
the authorities in Kiev and the Donbas supported the political
demands of the miners. The strike leaders also co-operated with
Ukrainian pro-independence and anti-communist groups. Although the
1991 strike did not assume a proportion capable of bringing down the
Soviet state, it became, nevertheless, “both a reflection of and a
further impetus to the decline of the Soviet ‘centre’”
(Siegelbaum 1997: 11). After the failed coup d’état of August 1991
in Moscow, the Soviet Union collapsed.
In
the referendum held on 1 December 1991, a Russified Donbas voted
overwhelmingly for the independence of Ukraine. With the turnout
approaching 80 percent, 84 percent of Donbas voters supported
independence (Kuzio and Wilson 1994: 198). On the same day, Leonid
Kravchuk, a Communist party functionary turned nationalist, was
elected to be president of Ukraine. The first phase of the miners’
movement was over.
Adjustment:
1992-1994
With
the new independent Ukraine, all the demands of the Donbas miners
seemed to be finally realised. Yet post-communist transformations and
Ukraine’s nation-building process soon generated new challenges for
the miners’ movement. The goals of the miners and other vocal
Ukrainian opposition groups in opposing the Soviet state and “Moscow
bureaucracy” were almost identical. This similarity, however, was
based on different beliefs. Ukrainian national intellectuals
perceived independence as their greatest objective per se. As Kuzio
and Wilson have emphasised, the intelligentsia has approached
“practical” demands of the workers as something to be solved by
itself through tackling the political issue. Members of Rukh, the
largest opposition force, concentrated on cultural and political
issues. At the First Congress of Rukh, promoting “democratisation
and the expansion of glasnost’” was supported by 75 percent of
the delegates; 73 percent advocated “the development of Ukrainian
language and culture,” but only 46 percent prioritised “the
solving of pressing economic problems” (Kuzio and Wilson 1994:
111). Contrary to the intelligentsia, the workers supported Ukraine’s
independence because they believed it would improve their material
conditions. The Donbas miners thought Ukraine’s independence would
assure the enterprise autonomy and the accountability of the state
(Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995; Kuzio and Wilson 1994: 110;
Siegelbaum 1997: 17; Kuromiya 1998: 333). As Crowley has put it:
The
support of the Russian-speaking Donba[s] miners for Ukrainian
sovereignty was based not on nationalism, but on the hope that a
Ukrainian government with more independence would provide a better
deal than the Soviet government in terms of what it took away and
what it gave back, while events would be easier to control in Kiev
than in Moscow (Crowley 1995: 59).
The
miners’ victory has appeared to be short-lived. Independence did
not bring economic betterment. Despite pressing economic needs, the
main effort of the state authorities was placed not on economic
transformation, but on the institutionalisation of the new Ukrainian
nation (von Hirschhausen 1998: 452). New Ukrainian authorities
appeared to be embedded with economic nationalism and habits of
central planning. Central ministries were continuing to prescribe
quantitative economic plans and the state retained its tight control
over the economy (Verkhovna Rada 1994). Ukraine’s government “tried
to preserve an industrial structure which could not be preserved”
(von Hirschhausen 1998: 452; see also Boss 1994; Sekarev 1995). By
the end of 1993, gross domestic product (GDP) fell by more than 40
percent (CIA 1999; Havrylyshyn et al. 1998). In 1993, real wages were
only 57.6 percent from the 1991 level.
Consumer
prices skyrocketed by 13,046 percent (Lavigne 1999: 290-291). As late
as 1994, Ukraine, in fact, had made no progress in reforming its
economy (EBRD 1994). The vague economic policy of successive
Ukrainian governments pushed the country into “one of the deepest
post-Soviet recessions experienced by any of the transition economies
not affected by war” (EIU 1998: 16).
By
1993, the most common feeling among Donbas workers was a sense of
approaching “civil war”, “revolution” or “social explosion”
(interviews with miners in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995: 186; 209).
At this moment, regional elites – local administration officials,
clientelistic groupings and industrial lobbies – entered the
political stage to champion “the region’s interests”. In the
first few years after independence, Donets’k hold establishing
congresses and conferences of six political organisations: the
Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal
Party, the Party of Slavonic Unity and the Civic Congress of Ukraine
(Bolbat et al. 1994). Besides the communists, headed by Petro
Symonenko, the Donets’k oblast’ CPSU committee secretary in the
1980s, other parties failed to gain a broad country-wide support.
However, as some observers noticed, all the parties succeeded in
developing a similar political agenda for the Donbas, advocating
regional autonomy, self-government, legal status for Russian as the
official language in the Donbas and as a second state language in
Ukraine, and closer ties and re-integration within the CIS (Wilson
1993; Nemir’ya 1995; Smith and Wilson 1997: 849). As the Donbas was
significantly contributing to the national budget (see Table 4),
radicals accused Kiev of “expropriating all the Donbas monies”
and pumping them into nationalist and “culturally alien” West
Ukrainian provinces (see Nemir’ya 1995: 457). The regionalist
political agenda set by newly established parties and informal
groupings gained support from local mass media.
Donbas
miners joined the campaign. In February 1992, Ukrainian miners
established the Independent Miners’ Union of Ukraine (NPHU).
Firstly, the NPHU, alongside the once-official Trade Union of Coal
Mining Industry Employees (PPVP), began to pursue trade-unionist
demands bargaining with Kiev for subsidies, pensions and wages. Given
the unresponsiveness of Ukraine’s government preoccupied with
ethno-nationalising policies, the Donbas miners began to support the
idea of developing the region’s own economic policy. After several
waves of picketing the Ukrainian parliament, the offices of the
central government and the regional administration, the miners
resorted to the most successful mechanism of their movement. On 7
June 1993, the first mine in Donets’k stopped working. The next
day, another 75 mines joined the strike. The industrial action was
co-ordinated by the Donets’k strike committee which put forth
radical political demands: (1) regional independence for the Donbas,
and (2) a country-wide referendum on (no) confidence in Ukraine’s
president and the parliament (Crowley 1995: 6). More than 300 mines
and major industrial enterprises in the Donbas took part in the
strike.
The
political demands of the miners enjoyed the support of both coal
mining trade-unions, mine directors and other industrialists,
Donbas-based political parties and movements, local officials, mass
media and the majority of the region’s population:
It
was therefore not simply a strike of miners and other workers, nor a
“directors’ strike” with workers performing the role of foot
soldiers, but a regional protest against the government in Kiev, its
president, and policies that had brought the Donba[s] to its knees
(Crowley and Siegelbaum 1995: 72).
The
strike did not end after president Kravchuk fired the then prime
minister Leonid Kuchma and appointed Iukhym Zviahil’skyi, director
of the mine where the strike had begun, to be the acting head of the
cabinet. Moreover, the tensions were growing. On 14 June 1993, the
Donets’k oblast’ legislature put on its agenda the declaration of
the Donbas “regional independence”. Russian was soon declared to
be the official language in the Donbas (Burnosov 1995: 55). The
support for regional independence was not overwhelming however.
Neither the leadership of NPHU and PPVP nor the rank and file miners
advocated Donbas independence (Burnosov 1995: 55). Nonetheless, the
Donets’k city strike committee threatened Kiev to call for a
general nation-wide strike and civil disobedience throughout the
region, unless the political demands were satisfied. Behaving
militantly, president Kravchuk declared the state of emergency in the
country and took over the cabinet. To prevent civil unrest, the
Ukrainian parliament finally agreed to hold the referendum on
Kravchuk’s presidency and new parliamentary elections. The
government’s emergency commission agreed to consider “economic
independence” for the Donbas and satisfy demands for wage increases
and indexations (Crowley and Siegelbaum 1995: 71-72; Crowley 1995:
6-7; Burnosov 1995: 54-56; Siegelbaum 1997: 18).
The
June 1993 strike was the most successful contentious collective
action of Donbas miners. Their movement succeeded in sustaining
interaction with antagonists, elites and society. It also managed to
become the most powerful mobilising structure and framing process for
public protest in the country. However, as some commentators noticed,
the subsumption of the movement “within a larger regional framework
altered its character and placed it at the disposal of other economic
and political forces” (Crowley and Siegelbaum 1995: 72; see also
Nemir’ya 1995: 456). The scale of popular discontent turned the
miners’ strike into not so much an economic struggle “as a
struggle between the Donbas region and the rest of the country”
(Seigelbaum 1997: 18). This struggle provoked doubts in Ukraine’s
survival as an independent state (Solchanyk 1994; see Crowley 1995:
65). Though the 1993 strike was initiated by the miners, it had been
eventually headed by the regional elite and the oblast’
administration.
Kuromiya
has argued that the miners’ demand for a free economic zone was, in
fact, a rejection of the old, centrally planed economy preserved by
the central government in Kiev (Kuromiya 1998: 333). Nonetheless,
pro-market features of the 1993 strike were engulfed in broader
regionalist protest. Consequently, in the March-April 1994
parliamentary elections, opposition forces headed by hard-liners from
the Communist party won the majority of seats in the region. In the
aftermath of the strike, Donbas voters assured the victory of Leonid
Kuchma, a former prime minister and a pragmatic industrialist, over
Leonid Kravchuk in the June-July 1994 presidential elections (see
Table 5). The miners’ movement entered the last phase of its
development.
Fragmentation:
1995 - present
Actively
contending the governing authorities, Donbas miners perceived
democratisation and marketisation as means of achieving their main
aim. “Moscow bureaucrats” and “Kiev nationalists” were
consequently seen as the main obstacle to a “civilised way of
living.” With the election of Leonid Kuchma, the last miners’
rival fell down. However, it appeared that the “fruits” of
miners’ victory were to become their new and ultimate challenge
(Siegelbaum 1997).
In
October 1994, the administration of president Kuchma launched a
programme of market-oriented reforms. Within three years, the
government achieved macro-economic and monetary stabilisation.
Inflation rate fell from skyrocketing 10,000 percent annually in 1993
to 15 percent in 1997. If between 1991 and 1996, Ukraine’s national
currency lost 18,000 times its value against US dollar, during the
next four years the national currency was devaluated by 3.3 times
only. Substantial progress was also made on price and trade
liberalisation and small-scale privatisation. The majority of
state-owned enterprises was formally privatised or commercialised. By
mid-1999, the private sector share of GDP reached 55 percent (EBRD
1999: 24). Nevertheless, Ukraine’s GDP continued to fall until a
one-percent recovery in 1998. Ukraine’s real GDP that year was only
38 percent of its 1989 level (Stern 1998: 2). The lack of any
significant structural reforms was blamed for the decline of
Ukraine’s economy (von Hirschhausen: 1998).
The
World Bank and the International Energy Agency reports have described
Ukraine’s coal industry as in “a deep crisis” and in “a
painful decline” (WB 1996; IEA 1996). The coal industry suffered a
50 percent slump in coal output between 1990 and 1995.
Notwithstanding, labour rationalisation efforts were minimal.
According to independent reports, in 1995, Ukraine’s coal industry
employed 650,000 miners, who produced 65.6 million tons of coal in
276 mines and 64 coal washing plants. Taking into account people
employed in supporting functions, mining-related industries,
managerial and technical staff, and social services (such as
kindergartens, hospitals and sanatoria), the total number of
Ukraine’s coal industry employees was around 1,000,000 (i.e. 2.5
percent of the national labour force). One-third of Ukrainian mines
produced coal at a cost above the average import price (IEA 1996:
157-8; Lovei 1998: 2). The World Bank noted that “even under a
relatively optimistic scenario, about half of the people directly
employed in coal extraction may have to leave over the next five
years” (WB 1996: 19-21, as cited in Siegelbaum 1997: 16).
According to a famous observation, “the spectre of the Iron Lady
has hanged over the “bloated” mining industry, the miners’
movement, and the miners themselves” (Siegelbaum 1997: 1, 22).
While
trying to curb inflation and reduce budget deficit, Ukraine’s
government decreased the amount of subsidies given to the coal
industry. The first restructuring efforts resulted in mounting
financial losses and payment arrears across all sectors of the
economy (see Figure 1). A new cycle of miners’ protest began in
November 1995, when all branch leaders of the NPHU went on a hunger
strike over unpaid wages and the deterioration in living conditions.
Coal deliveries to customers were halted (Monitor, November 3, 1995).
In February 1996, miners in Russia and Ukraine started a simultaneous
mass strike recalling the events of 1989.
Nevertheless,
there was a critical difference between the previous and new phases
of contention. Contrary to the events of 1989 and 1991, the miners
now had “eschewed political demands to focus instead on their empty
wallets” (Monitor, February 2, 1996). Over 600,000 Donbas miners
took part in the protest refusing to load coal and demanding about
$122 million in back wages. Gaining support from steel workers, the
trade-union leaders called for a general strike. However, after some
government’s promises to pay the wages, the strike was “suspended.”
Notwithstanding
the resignation of prime minister Evhen Marchuk, the industrial
action was soon resumed. In July 1996, about 140,000 Donbas miners
took part in blocking roads, railway tracks and picketing the
regional administration headquarters. Given the paralysis of highway
and rail traffic in the Donbas, Ukraine’s new prime minister, Pavlo
Lazarenko, and other government officials concluded a strike
settlement with both miners’ trade unions. The government assured a
full repayment of the overdue wages. Donets’k governor was
dismissed by president Kuchma for “having lost control of the
situation in the region.” Nevertheless, radical leaders of the
Donets’k strike committee did not accept the settlement and
continued the strike and the traffic blockage. This time, the
governing authorities resorted to repression. The leaders of the
Donets’k strike committee were arrested and put on trial in a
remote provincial town. The riot police forced the miners to clear
roads and railway tracks.
After
the July 1996 protest, the fragmentation of the miners’ movement
was furthered by the government’s restructuring programme. All coal
mines were divided into four categories: (1) profitable mines; (2)
mines that were given a year to regain profitability; (3) mines
scheduled to be closed down within three to five years; (4) mines,
where production were stopped in anticipation of immediate closure
(Lovei 1998; Egorova and Otto 1998). The non-payment crisis
accompanied by a “Thatcherite solution” had an immense impact on
the miners’ movement:
Many
who were once active became disgusted with the failure of the
movement to improve conditions for miners and their families or even
arrest their deterioration. Some have taken advantage of skills honed
in strike committees to go into business or another profession.
Mutual recrimination and rivalry between the two unions, among
different regions and within them, profitable and unprofitable mines,
repeatedly fractured the movement causing further leakage. Tensions
within the movement were exacerbated by the unequal distribution of
subsidies which virtually invited miners to engage in locally
organised protests to obtain their share (Siegelbaum 1997: 21).
From
then on, wildcat strikes, spontaneous hunger strikes and pickets
became a daily occurrence in the Donbas. The repertoire of contention
included the blocking of roads and railway lines, a bomb threat,
marches of miners to regional capitals and Kiev, “indefinite”
refusals to work and underground strikes. Clashes with police,
collective suicide threats and several committed protest suicides
were among the most violent contentious actions that miners resorted
to. The payment of wage and pension arrears became the most repeated
demand.
In
May 1998, when the wage arrears approached US$1 billion, the NPHU
called a strike supported, nevertheless, by only 100,000 Donbas
miners at 45 mines. The participants demanded the payment of wage and
pension arrears, restoration of the 1990 parity of wages, pensions
and social benefits, and priority public financing for the coal
industry. The PPVP did not support the strike as “being
counterproductive”. Given the lack of co-ordination among the two
trade unions, some miners resorted to spontaneous measures. About
three thousand miners from western Donbas marched on foot about 100
kilometres to the regional capital of Dnipropetrovs’k and camped
outside the oblast’ administration building to claim wage arrears.
Some
1,000 miners reached Kiev on foot. Notwithstanding the mass media
publicity, the state and societal responses to the miners’ protest
were becoming increasingly hostile:
Popular
support for miners weakened when, starting in mid-1998,
representatives of other professions that were also suffering from
unpaid wages (such as teachers and nurses) argued publicly against
giving special treatment to miners. Recognising an opportunity, the
government decided to revitalise the process of coal industry
restructuring. A new coal minister was appointed in early June, and
agreement was reached with the World Bank about a revised reform
programme … bringing to fifty-two the number of mines closed or
under closure (Lovei 1998: 6).
Donbas
miners were again accused of being only interested in “pulling all
the blanket on themselves”. The miners’ reaction this time was
not anger but desperation. The suicide rate in the Donbas grew. On 14
December 1998, on the 155th day of picketing the oblast’
administration building in Luhans’k, one of 200 miners, Oleksandr
Mykhalevych, set himself on fire. On 22 January 1999, another miner,
Oleksandr Konariov, also burned himself to death to protest against
the humiliation of not being paid (Associated Press, 20 February
1999).
Common
depressive feelings among the region’s population were reflected in
the results of the 1998 parliamentary elections, when extreme left
and populist parties scored the biggest victories in the region (see
Table 6). The miners’ protest voting led to an additional $300
million allocated to the industry by the new parliament.
Nevertheless, new elections did not appear to succeed in halting the
pit closures. In line with official data, by the end of 1998, the
first twelve mines were closed in the Donbas. Around 372,000
employees left Ukraine’s coal industry that year. In 1999, another
20 mines were shut. The government planned to close another 49 mines
in 2000. Thus, the fragmentation of the miners’ movement was
followed by the start of their industry’s destruction.
In
February 1999, 171 mines stopped dispatching coal to customers. The
miners, organised this time by both trade unions, demanded the
payment of wage arrears and the increase of subsidies to the coal
industry. The NPHU threatened to put forth political demands,
including the resignation of the government and the president and to
organise massive riots unless the miners’ demands were met. Having
decided to run for re-election in October 1999, president Kuchma was
ready to intervene into the labour conflict. He ordered the cabinet
to “prioritise payment of the miners’ wage arrears”. To
mitigate social unrest and mainly to gain support from the ambitious
Donbas elites, president Kuchma finally granted a status of “free
economic zone” to Donets’k oblast’, the most populous among the
two Donbas provinces. According to a law adopted by the parliament
just before the October 1999 presidential elections, Donets’k
oblast’ was designated for the establishment of two special
economic zones with long tax and custom duty havens. Seventeen mining
towns in the Donbas were given a status of “priority development
territories” (Verkhovna Rada 1999).
During
the 1999 presidential campaign, Kuchma visited the Donbas on several
media publicised occasions. Using heavy-handed techniques against his
opponents, Kuchma began to re-conquer the Donbas “Soviet belt”
previously occupied exclusively by the Communist party. He promised
to provide Donbas clientelistic elites with even more “economic
independence”. In return, he was given an overwhelming backing by
regional officials, local business circles and mass media (Kyiv Post,
20 May 1999). “Kuchma is for the Donbas. So, the Donbas is for
Kuchma!” was the message to get the best promotion in the region
(Kyiv Post, 28 October 1999). This message also appeared to be the
most heard one. During the first round of the elections on 31 October
1999, Donbas voters gave their preferences to Petro Symonenko,
Donets’k-based leader of Ukrainian communists. Nevertheless, during
the second round on 14 December 1999, Kuchma succeeded in defeating
Symonenko in the Donbas and, thus, in the country as a whole (see
Table 7).
Soon
after the elections, the bulk of state-owned property was
redistributed to Ukraine’s most powerful elites that fully
supported the “old and new” president (Halyts’ki kontrakty, no.
2-3, January 2000). According to several presidential decrees,
Donets’k and Dnipropetrovs’k oblast’ administrations were given
management rights over all state-owned and state-controlled companies
and enterprises in their respective oblast’s. The two oblast’s
administrations have obtained management rights over the two largest
energy companies in Ukraine. The oblast’’ officials were
effectively empowered to authorise all economic activity in the two
regions (Halyts’ki kontrakty, no. 7, February 2000). Moreover, the
government and the regional elites initiated talks as to the
establishment by July 2000 of Donets’k and Dnipropetrovs’k
regional power “supercompanies”. The two “supercompanies”
would encompass all energy, coal mining and washing enterprises, as
well as R&D and banking institutions that exist in Donets’k and
Dnipropetrovs’k oblast’s.
Donbas
miners struck relentlessly in January and February 2000. The
industrial action was either spontaneous or organised separately by
the NPHU or the PPVP. Almost all steam mines (120 out of 135 left)
halted to deliver coal to customers demanding higher subsidies and
wages, the payment of wage and pension arrears as well as the
stoppage of increasing coal imports from Poland and Russia. The
Ukrainian government decisively refused to “cede itself to the
populist demands”. According to a local newspaper, “the
trade-union leaders do not nourish any particular hopes in the
success of their action” (Gorod, No. 6, February 2000).
Explaining
the failure
Since
1989, Donbas miners have been engaged in a sustained contentious
interaction with their powerful opponents – the state and governing
authorities. Resorting to various forms of protest, the miners’
movement has tried to facilitate the creation of “normal life”
for its participants. As the sections above have shown, the miners
did not succeed in achieving their aim. The sad irony is that the
miners’ movement failed even to arrest the deterioration in living
and working conditions of its participants. The Donbas miners
continued to live and perish under increasingly desperate
circumstances. Writing in 1997, Lewis Siegelbaum noted that “the
miners’ movement has been sufficiently powerful to prevent a
‘Thatcherite solution’, but not strong enough to compel their
governments to adopt a more human one” (p. 27). By now, the
strength of the miners’ movement has been weakened even further.
Why has the miners’ movement failed? Was there any chance for its
success?
Social
movement theories emphasise the significance of three broad sets of
factors that account for the emergence, development or decline of
contentious politics. These three determinants are: (1) political
opportunities – “changes in the institutional structure or
informal power relations of a given political system;” (2)
mobilising structures – “those collective vehicles, informal as
well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in
collective action;” and (3) framing processes – “conscious
strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared
understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and
motivate collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996: 1-20). Tarrow has
linked these three broad sets of factors by stressing the degree of
turbulence generated by social movements:
Changes
in political opportunities and constraints create the most important
incentives for initiating new phases of contention. These actions in
turn create new opportunities both for the original insurgents and
for latecomers, and eventually for opponents and power holders. The
cycles of contention – and in rare cases, the revolutions – that
ensue are based on the externalities that these actors gain and
create. The outcomes of such waves of contention depend not on the
justice of the cause or the persuasive power of any single movement,
but on their breadth and the reactions of elites and other groups
(1998: 7).
It
is argued that the failure of the Donbas miners’ movement was
determined in the first cycle of its contention. During the
mobilisation phase, the miners used the changes in political
opportunities and constraints provided by perestroika and
democratisation to engage into the collective contentious action
against powerful Moscow “partocrats”. The shifting of alignments
within the Communist state hierarchy assured the absence of
repression against the workers. The division of political elites
between communist hard-liners, bureaucratic moderates and nationalist
radicals provided the miners with access to the political output.
However,
it was the “national democratic” intelligentsia but not the
workers from other industries that appeared to become the miners’
most influential allies in their fight for the autonomy and
independence from the “centre”. The opponents of the Donbas
miners and the Ukrainian intellectuals – “imperialists and
exploiters in Moscow” – were identical. Nevertheless, the framing
process of their joint collective action was different. The miners
mobilised for welfare gains, believed to be achieved through
marketisation and privatisation. On the other hand, the preservation
of national culture and language, threatened by Russian and Soviet
assimilatory policies, was the main concern of the Ukrainian
humanitarian intelligentsia. So long as “Moscow” continued to
exist, the link between the workers and the intellectuals sustained
itself. That link was vague however. Operating within different
cultural frames, the miners and the intellectuals failed to establish
a common mobilising structure to reinforce their pro-democracy and
pro-market challenges. No joint opposition institution emerged.
Besides
the intellectuals, there was another broader segment of the
population to whom the miners’ strive for normal life could had
been more appealing. Why did not other post-Soviet Ukraine’s
workers join the Donbas miners? Crowley indicated that the difference
in economic deprivation and enterprise paternalism determined, on the
one hand, the particular militancy of miners and, on the other hand,
the lack of trans-occupational solidarity among workers in general
(1995). The apparent lack of working-class solidarity is recognised
as the main reason for the failure of the labour movement to “become
an organised political force of capable of bringing about permanent
social changes” (Temkina 1991: 17; as quoted in Crowley and
Siegelbaum 1995: 66; for similar accounts see Teague 1992). Hence no
Ukrainian “Solidarity” was born.
The
political opportunities created by the common action of Donbas miners
and Kiev intellectuals were eventually seized by the former
nomenklatura and new business elites. During the second phase of the
miners’ movement, the support previously provided by the national
intelligentsia vanished. Coal managers, regional clientelistic
groupings, business elites and broad segments of the local Russophone
population were to become new miners’ allies. The movement was
gradually transformed into a powerful mobilising structure for
regionalist protest. The 1993 strike became a significant political
opportunity for latecoming local elites in their contentious
interaction with the new “centre”. By opposing Kiev antagonists,
the miners’ movement became a part in the national power struggle
between regional and central clientelistic groupings and elites.
The
start of market reforms and industrial restructuring fragmented and
further weakened the miners’ movement. The Donbas elites gained an
access to privatisation and property re-distribution mechanisms and
lost their interest in the miners’ mobilising structures. In the
third cycle of contention, the miners’ movement was abandoned by
its last ally – broad strata of the Donbas population. The economic
crisis enormously increased the cost of collective contentious
action. The double dependence of workers on the enterprise and, in
turn, of the enterprise on the state budget became the main
demobilising factor in the workers’ fight for survival (Crowley and
Siegelbaum 1995; Cook 1995; Crowley 1995; Siegelbaum 1997).
Growing
unemployment and the degradation in living standards among various
social groups of the Ukrainian society had a deligitimising affect on
the miners’ movement. The sense of injustice and emotionality
eventually turned into a feeling of helplessness, frustration and
depression. Political opportunities previously enjoyed by the miners
also declined. The access to political and economic output was closed
by the emerging consensus between former antagonists. Under Kuchma,
national power struggle games became an internal affair of Kiev,
Dnipropetrovs’k and Donets’k elites. The elites’ selective use
of repression (as during the 1996 strikes), fragmentation (e.g. by
providing the mines with different status) and incentives (e.g. by
granting “economic independence”) had the effect of demobilising
the miners.
The
Donbas miners began their contention as a civil reformist movement.
They mobilised hoping for changes in the economic and political
system to be obtained through democratic and market-oriented reforms.
The miners’ action ended as a marginal labour movement from a
declining industry trying to save jobs and income. According to
several observers, such a drastic trajectory could have been avoided,
had the miners forged an organised political identity with a
social-democratic platform (Walkowitz 1995; Crowley 1995). However,
no one appeared to be able to ally with the miners to imprint this
political identity in a broader political institution.
Counterbalancing
the state
The
case of the Donbas miners suggests that not all Eastern Europeans
were able to sustain their patience under post-communism. Some
Eastern Europeans did protest against draconian economic conditions
of post-communist transformation. Moreover, they resorted to violent
and disruptive as well as conventional forms of public protest. The
militancy of the miners’ movement was caused by a traditional
factor – economic inequality and deprivation. The miners’
contentious action produced a social movement capable of influencing
state policies and the government. Nevertheless, what happened
afterwards was not the outcome the social movement had aimed at.
It
appears that it is not the mere existence or absence of public
protest that matters. Even violent, disruptive and prolonged public
protest can be a failure without a constructive response from elites
and social groups. As Tarrow has suggested, policy elites respond not
to the claims of any individual movement but to the degree of
turbulence generated by it (1998: 25). In the case of Ukraine,
firstly, the cultural framing process associated with the Donbas
miners’ movement could not generate a country-wide turbulence or a
constructive reaction from other societal groups. Second, the
political constraints and economic crisis disabled any further
turbulence and made it self-defeating. New political opportunities,
framing processes and even mobilising structures created by the
miners’ movement were seized not by the original insurgents
themselves, but by others who sought more “modest”, less
inclusive utility-maximising goals and were more effective at
advancing them (Tarrow 1998: 174-5). The Donbas miners were
effectively outmaneuvred by rent-seeking latecomers from the regional
elite as well as by power holders. Thus, the miners’ movement
failed to bring about far reaching social changes or, at least, to
defend its claims due to an absence of allies rather than to the
alleged lack of protest.
Since
its birth during the “hot summer” of 1989, the Donbas miners’
movement became a symbol of the emerging civil society. The miners
were a group of citizens actively checking and opposing the state.
Moreover, on several occasions, the miners clearly approached the
victory of civil society, “when the state was checked by an
institution with an economic base” (Gellner 1996: 211). The failure
of the miners’ movement suggests that during post-communist
transformation, the state can preserve and increase its power over
other public spheres. The role of the state and governing authorities
in conducting economic transition or re-distributing public property
can be very significant. When it is the case, polity and economy
continue to be an interconnected entity that relies on informal
bargains and personal rewards rather than economic growth for its
stability. The Donbas miners failed because they were not given a
positive societal response. Other social groups did not join the
movement due to their dependence on the state budget and the
bureaucrats responsible for the re-distribution of the budget. Under
the circumstances where there is no economy independent from the
state and the polity, civil society and its institutions have no
autonomous base for existence. Paraphrasing Gellner, one must say
that it is still clear who is boss in some post-communist societies.
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