Whether it makes more sense to conceive of the miners of the Donbas and their collective representation as confronted by forces analogous to fourteenth-century western Europe or sixteenth-century eastern Europe, clearly theirs has not been an easy lot since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Of course, much the same can be said for the overwhelming majority of other workers. What distinguished the miners, however, was not extraordinary privation but rather their sustaining of an "independent" movement determined to create a "normal life" for themselves and their families. Now increasingly demoralized and numbering no more than 400,000, they probably no longer have what it takes to continue to do so.
by: Lewis
H. Siegelbaum
Department
of History, Michigan State University
In
July 1989, miners went on strike throughout the Soviet Union's
far-flung coalfields. This was big news at the time. The unfolding of
glasnost and perestroika hitherto had provoked little response from
workers in contrast to the Moscow-centered intelligentsia, and
neophyte nationalists in the Baltic, the Caucasus, and western
Ukraine. Suddenly, class issues were thrown into the mix, and the
western media accommodated by sending correspondents and film crews
to parts of Russia and Ukraine rarely visited in the past.
I
arrived in Donetsk towards the tail end of the strike as part of a
motley crew of scholars, videographers, and college students who had
been assembled in Pittsburgh by an unemployed steelworker to take
advantage of a recently launched sister-city exchange program. Thus
began my acquaintance with the "city of coal and roses,"
its mines, and miners. It was, at first, a rather uncomfortable
experience. More than once I and my colleagues were mistaken by
miners for "korrespondenty"
from the western media ("Eto BBC, da? Washington Post?"). A
labor historian whose work then focused exclusively on the 1930s, I
had managed to limit my acquaintance with Soviet workers to libraries
and archives. They, my subjects, were all deceased and as far as I
was concerned, that was just fine. In Donetsk by contrast, I was
persuaded to interview on camera miners - both active and retired -
members of their families, neighbors, managerial and
engineering-technical personnel, trade union officials, and even the
proverbial man (or, as I recall, women) in the street. From such
interviews, a rather dramatic meeting of the Kuibyshev and Panfilov
mines' trade union council filmed by our crew, and footage of the
strike itself obtained from Donetsk television, an hour-length
documentary film was made. It remains an effective device for
teaching about that particular time and place.
I
returned to Donetsk twice, in 1991 and 1992, to do more
interviewing. In the course of those years and for a few that
followed, I wrote quite a bit about the miners' movement. Some of it
was publisistika
and
included an attempt to expose the strong-arm tactics of the AFL-CIO's
Free Trade Union Institute; some masqueraded as oral history; and
some was a combination of several genres. The fact that with the
exception of a few articles all were collaborative suggests the
degree to which I was unsure of going it alone as I ventured into and
remained within the contemporary. Some time later in the 1990s,
hoping to catch up with what had happened in the interim, I returned
to the subject of the miners' movement, but still unsure of the
status or quality of my work and whether it was sufficiently
"historical," published it in a rather obscure journal.
Thereafter, I more or less abandoned attempts to keep up to date,
publishing only one article of a general nature, a "ten-year
retrospective" on labor in post-Soviet Russia. In the meantime,
a rich, extensive literature on the miners' movement had been
produced by sociologists and political scientists well disposed
towards labor if not the solutions proffered by the movement itself.
However, for reasons that may have had to do with the greater
political salience of the Russian movement, most of it focused on the
Kuzbass and Inta regions rather than the Ukrainian Donbas.
It
is now more than fifteen years since the events of 1989 first brought
the miners' movement to the world's attention and me to the Donbas.
This is long enough to have developed an historical perspective about
what happened then and subsequently, although the passage of time
alone is not and never can be sufficient. In revisiting this terrain,
I have discovered the need to revise some of my earlier formulations
partly in response to previously overlooked or new ones and partly
because subsequent developments have thrown into relief the
peculiarities of the period. My framework of analysis is the
interplay between agency (usually associated with choice,
spontaneity, and indeterminacy) and circumstances or structure
(recurring patterns of thought and behavior that limit agency) with
an appreciation for the overlapping if not fluid character of these
dual determinations.
Samokritika
of an Historian
As
Charles Maier has written with respect to the dissolution of East
Germany, "a reading of the events of 1989 . . . suggests (and
not just in a trivial tautological sense) that political action in
its own right first beckons and then certainly succeeds only when
long-term conditions permit." The reverse, he notes, is also the
case: "the same events reveal that political activity, at least
if pursued with stamina and persistence, helps shape in turn the
causal environment critical to its own success." In other words,
"the year 1989 confirms that historical analysis must rely
continuously on working out this reciprocal interaction."
Recognizing the usefulness of this observation, it is incumbent on
the historian to specify the mechanisms that make an environment
"causal."
Let
us begin by examining the agents of political action and the
environment within which they acted. At the most basic level, the
miners' movement could not have existed without the presence of at
least three factors: lots of miners, a general feeling among them of
having lost ground, and the perception among activists that
circumstances favored taking their grievances beyond normal channels.
As of 1989, some 1.2 million people were employed in coal mining in
the Soviet Union of whom nearly two-thirds were involved directly in
production. Despite the increased importance in recent decades of
nuclear power, natural gas and other sources of energy, coal remained
a significant component of the Soviet fuel balance. Indeed, just as
the Soviet Union had overtaken the United States as the world's
leading producer of crude steel and other quintessentially industrial
materials by the 1970s, so even earlier it surpassed the US and all
other countries in coal tonnage.
But
so what? These were indices of industrial prowess of a bygone era,
part of what Maier (again) referred to as the "romance of coal
and steel," that reached its apogee in the 1930s and 1940s.
Think of the giant smelting plants in the American heartland, think
of Stakhanov and Magnitogorsk. Through the 1950s the integrated steel
mill was a worldwide industrial status symbol, the basis of western
Europe's post-war industrial reconstruction, but by the 1970s this
was no longer the case. The simultaneous decline of coal in the West
was even more precipitous. In the Ruhr, mining which had employed
500,000 people in the mid 1950s was the occupation of only 128,000 in
1977; in France, there were only 43,000 miners by 1980 compared to
320,000 in 1960; and in Britain during those twenty years, the
workforce was halved while output dropped from 200 million tons to
130 million.
"Constant
revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all
social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation . . . All
old-established national industries . . . dislodged by new
industries." Marx and Engels would have understood quite well
what was happening during these painful decades of restructuring.
By contrast, the centrally planned "socialist" economies of
Eastern Europe stuck to what they knew best, continuing to "pump
iron" in Maier's felicitous phrase. Think Nova Huta. This
strategy involved little social uprooting or displacement; it was
more like staying in place.
The
problem was that the more these economies integrated themselves with
the capitalist "globalizing" economies via trade and
credits for investment, the more the romance of coal and steel doomed
millions of workers to "a subsidized system of 'outdoor relief'
or job subsidies." The 1980s was the decade in which (thanks to
Margaret Thatcher's unyielding hostility to subsidies of any kind
except those targeting entrepreneurs) Britain divested itself all but
a handful of the 170 mines that had employed more than 180,000
workers as late as 1984; at the same time, coal extraction in the
United States relocated to the non-unionized, open-pit mines of the
western states. The result was a more than twofold increase in output
per worker but a halving of the mining workforce. The similarities
between the Pittston strike in Virginia with the more or less
simultaneously occurring Soviet miners' strike are superficial,
notwithstanding expressions of mutual solidarity. The Pittston strike
was essentially against the company's radical departure from what had
been standard employment and benefit practices; the Soviet strike
was precipitated by the failure of the state to change anything
except its rhetoric.
In
March 1990 Ted Friedgut and I wrote that "It was not fear of the
disruptive effects of economic reform that drove the miners to
strike, but rather anxiety that perestroika was passing them by."
I now would argue that this statement as well as our formulation of
"perestroika from below" was insufficiently nuanced and
exaggerated the extent to which miners and other workers identified
with the agenda and policies of Mikhail Gorbachev. It flattened
multiple possibilities into dichotomies such as the friends and foes
of change, pro- and anti-perestroika factions, and reformists and
"hard-liners," formulations that were fairly common in
western discourse then and for some time thereafter. It denied the
possibility that what was at stake was not whether change was
possible or even the speed with which it was to occur, but rather the
direction of change and who would control it.
To
say as we did - with rather alarming confidence - that "the
outbreak of the strike was the result of frustrated expectations"
was to presuppose that expectations among this particular segment of
Soviet society had been raised in the first place. There was some
basis for this assumption, namely the results of a sociological
survey among 216 Donetsk miners that seemed to indicate that
frustrated expectations were "the primary cause." But I now
am moved to wonder who was putting whom on, that is, whether miners
were simply engaging in the standard practice of subalterns of
presenting a public transcript to authorities, witless sociologists,
and other scholars.
Did
miners ever believe that the perestroika about which Gorbachev and
his fellow Communist reformists talked incessantly would improve
their lot? There is little evidence to support an affirmative answer
to this question. To be sure, the early declarations issued by the
miners' strike and workers' committees in July and August 1989 made
mention of "all possible support for economic perestroika"and
the like. But such formulations might equally support the contention
that, much like nationalists in the Baltic republics and Armenia,
kooperativshchiki
and party bosses transforming themselves into petty (and not so
petty) capitalists, miners were appropriating the language of
perestroika for purposes of protective coloration.
Why
though would they have needed protective coloration? This brings me
to the third of the three factors cited earlier. More than four years
after Gorbachev had become general secretary, the Soviet Union was in
a state approximating Yeats' evocation of the Second Coming: things
were falling apart and the center was not holding. The rapid
expansion of heterodox protest movements and the unwillingness (or
failure) of the state to reign them in may well have been part of the
causal environment in which the miners' movement emerged. However,
it still was not clear how long this situation would last. Recent
events in Tbilisi no less than the sorry fate of worker protests
under Gorbachev's predecessors – including the massacre at
Novocherkassk in 1962 and the rough treatment received by the Donetsk
dissidents Vladimir Klebanov and Alexei Nikitin during the Brezhnev
era - suggested that state repression was not out of the question.
In short, what may have persuaded miners in the Donbas to join a
strike begun elsewhere, only to suspend it after a few days, was that
the state had not cracked down . . . but might if pushed too far. By
the same token, it is possible to argue that the greater
audaciousness of demands advanced during the second all-Union strike
in March-April 1991 as well as the strike's more obviously political
and protracted nature reflected a greater awareness on the part of
strike leaders (at least) of the state's progressive weakness of
resolve, authority, and command over resources.
If
our understanding of the movement as pro-perestroika was too
simplistic, then our assessment of the strike's outcome (viz.,
"the Donbass miners have won a signal victory for perestroika")
seems hardly sustainable. What the strike accomplished was the
setting up of strike/workers' committees at the enterprise, city, and
regional levels. These organizations paralleled the pre-existing
trade union, municipal/soviet and party bodies, essentially usurping
their authority. Eventually, much of their personnel and energy were
transferred to the Independent Miners' Union (NPG) which held its
inaugural congress in October 1990 in Dontesk. The NPG was the main
organizational force behind the second all-Union miners' strike and
remained thereafter the prime institutional site of the miners'
movement. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, it subdivided into
separate Russian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian entities.
The
very existence of the strike committees and the NPG goes a long way
towards explaining how, if not why, the miners' movement survived
beyond the initial strike of 1989. Occupying
interstitial/intermediary space between officially-approved and
illegal bodies, they were analogous in this respect to the myriad
political movements thrown up by the reform process, some with a
nationalist orientation and others speaking in the name of the
environment and democracy. As fundamentally class-based
organizations free of (and largely hostile towards) Communist
influence, they also were illustrative of an extraordinary moment in
Soviet history. Despite its teleological implications, the best term
to describe this moment would be "transitional." While
labor and its representation were no longer under Communist control,
the rule of capital had yet to assert itself. What this meant was
that workers' real and symbolic power was unusually strong.
Persisting throughout the 1980s in Poland, such a situation was
considerably more brief in the case of the USSR and most other east
European countries. With the obvious and important exception of
demonstrably worsening material conditions, it was the best of
circumstances for workers and their collective representation.
Workers were heroes of their own and others' narratives, and the very
unusualness of this situation accounts to a large extent for (what in
retrospect clearly was) the exaggerated optimism exuded by the
movement . . . and shared by many commentators.
Who (or What) is
to Blame?
In
October 2000 at a conference commemorating the tenth anniversary of
the founding of the Independent Miners' Union, Iurii Boldyrev, one of
Donetsk's best-known activists, offered a provocative explanation for
the impetus of the miners' movement. "The strike arose in 1989,"
he asserted, "not by popular initiative, but by Gorbachev's
permission. It was planned and carried out by the KGB which had been
involved in a bitter internal struggle. One faction triumphed and
organized the strike." To substantiate his claim, he referred to
two KGB agents, dressed in civilian clothes, whom he saw on the night
of July 21-22 leading the crowd that "had begun to disperse as
the strike was winding down." Boldyrev, speaking to fellow
(former) activists, concluded that as "the Soviet system
collapsed, it gave birth to monsters. We and you were one of those
monsters. This system decided for us whom we would become."
The
propensity to cast blame when things are perceived to have gone wrong
or expectations of improvement, emancipation, or deliverance have
been disappointed is as widespread as it is understandable. When
hope or "social authority" has been vested in others, the
urge to recast them as manipulative, deceitful, or otherwise "false"
is almost overwhelming. In recent years, as the plight of miners and
their industry in both Russia and Ukraine has worsened, many culprits
have been identified. Power-hungry politicians in Kiev, former
enterprise directors corrupted by their elevation to national office,
the World Bank, nationalists based in western Ukraine, Jews, former
miner-activists who used their experience in the movement as a
stepping stone to careers in politics and/or business, the miners
themselves who lacked the necessary "culture" or "maturity"
to know whom to support or what to do, and, of course, the communist
system that so ill-prepared them - the list is as long as it is
depressing to contemplate.
Boldyrev's
interpretation of the movement in which he had played such a
prominent role might be seen in this light. The notion that Gorbachev
and a(n unnamed) faction of the KGB manipulated the strike of July
1989 seems fairly ludicrous. Implying that miners were incapable of
organizing themselves and exercising judgment about what they wanted
to do, it is in the tradition of casting the narod
as naive and witless before "dark forces." Nevertheless,
it is a refreshingly de-romanticized view of the strike, and
implicitly raises the question of whether that movement spawned by
the strike could have sustained itself for more than two years
without the assistance of outside forces.
Boldyrev's
remarks were actually cited by a Moscow-based historian who notes the
near immunity from prosecution of strike leaders. Was this, he asks,
the consequence of their "exalted social authority" or "the
presence in the political leadership of the country of significant
forces who had an interest in the development of radical forms of
protest by the miners?" The suggestion that some sort of
alliance or at least compatibility of interests existed between
strike leaders and the forces of law and order might be more
compelling had the former's escape from prosecution been unusual. But
the anti-strike laws of 1989 and 1991 were far from unique in lacking
teeth. If the miners' movement did indeed have allies, let us look
elsewhere.
One
of the oddest things about the movement in Donetsk at least during
the period discussed here is that both the city's strike committee
and the NPG conducted their business from offices provided by the
regional production association, Donetskugol. What seems anomalous
in North American labor terms (imagine General Motors accommodating
the United Automobile Workers Union in its headquarters on Woodward
Avenue in Detroit) can be explained by the deep mutual dependency
between management and labor forged by their shared subordination to
authorities at the "center" of the administrative-command
system. Of course, the NPG represented a challenge to the authority
of the pre-existing Union of Workers in the Mining Industry and its
monopolistic control over the distribution of goods and services. But
from Donetsugol's standpoint, accommodating the insurgent NPG did not
necessitate breaching agreements with the old union, and the division
of labor between the two unions actually made strategic sense in
dealing with the center. For their part, miners acting through their
strike committees or councils of labor collectives (STKs) criticized
and even replaced individual managers and directors. But others who
evidently did a better job of prizing resources from the center to
distribute among miners and their families were praised and revered.
What Sarah Ashwin found to be the case in the Kuzbass mine she
studied, namely that miners considered the mine administration part
of the labor collective and vice
versa,
was no less evident in Donetsk.
This,
then, was not a struggle of workers against bosses any more than it
was between labor and capital. From the perspective of the miners and
their movement the enemy in the largest sense was "the system"
that extracted from miners their labor and its fruits and returned to
them less than they deserved. In 1989, Boldyrev had referred to it
as "ministerial feudalism;" others simply called it
"communism." If, so it was believed, the system (or,
alternatively, "the center") did not take so much but
rather left more for the mines to sell on the market, the mines
wouldn't need as much from the state. Miners described this happy,
market-based alternative as the key to the "normal life"
they were seeking. They typically called it "capitalism."
It
would be unfair to characterize this perspective as naive, not
because miners were so inexperienced in theorizing alternatives to
what they knew so well, but because so many other sectors of Soviet
society shared the same beliefs. Indeed, the view that the state had
to get out of the way of appropriating and redistributing resources,
dictating prices, and demanding sacrifices has a very familiar ring
and was by no means confined to Soviet citizens. What distinguished,
indeed animated, the miners' movement was a particularly fervent
belief in the two classically socialist claims to recompense -
entitlement through labor and need - even while it associated these
claims with capitalism.
If
the miners' belief in the inherent value of their labor derived from
their erstwhile role as heroes of socialist construction, then their
identification of the market as the mechanism for realizing that
value signified the delegitimization of the Soviet state's
redistributive power. Calls for "free" markets/prices also
testify to the appeal of neo-liberal ideas in the context of an
ideological void. It will require ethnographic investigation to know
whether miners obtained their ideas about markets primarily from
proselytization by "democrats," the media's sudden
saturation with images of prosperity abroad, or simply their own
reversal of Soviet propaganda's shibboleths. It is important though
not to assume that miners were passive in receiving others' ideas or
that their leaders were dupes of others' agendas.
As
I have noted elsewhere, the movement's demands on the state were
logically inconsistent: on the one hand, increasing subsidies, and on
the other, granting financial independence (khozraschet)
for the mines; on the one hand, access to markets to sell coal, on
the other, the exemption from the market of services and goods
historically provided by the mines. But we need not assume that the
inconsistency stemmed from the undue influence on the movement of
either mining directors or the liberal intelligentsia. The miners
themselves could have wanted subsidies and
market access for their product because they were convinced they
deserved both. They also believed, not without reason, that in the
prevailing circumstances their negotiating power had never been
greater and might never be as great again.
At
a meta-historical level, the causal environment for the articulation
of these demands was the breakdown of the re-distributional
functions of the centralized state - itself a product of the opening
that perestroika gave to alternative mechanisms. The demands
themselves and actions taken in support of them helped "shape
in turn the causal environment critical to [their] own success,"
or at least the course that the movement took. For nothing else can
quite explain why workers in other occupations were so hesitant and
for the most part ultimately unwilling to join the miners' movement
than that they regarded satisfaction of the miners' demands in
zero-sum terms. In this manner, cause and effect, structure and
agency operated in tandem, each creating the conditions for and
limitations on the other.
The
politicization of the movement - that is, the articulation of overtly
political demands - seems in this light less the consequence of its
radicalization than the recognition of the dangers of isolation and
the need to generalize the basis for protest. But "articulation,"
"recognition" and other attributes of agency can take us -
or them - only so far. The collapse or overthrow of the "system,"
which appeared so unlikely in 1989, rapidly became conceivable as the
entire economy and the outlying republics spun out of the center's
control. The further incapacitation of the Soviet state and the
dramatic rise in Russia of an alternative source of political power
in the form of Boris Yeltsin and Democratic Russia became the
environment that "caused" the miners' movement to initiate
its second all-Union strike in 1991. That action in turn complicated
the state's ability to deal with other challenges. Gorbachev's
agreement to transfer jurisdictional authority over the mines to
respective union republics was thus far from an insignificant
concession. At least for the miners it symbolized as nothing else the
dismantling of "the system" which had reared them and which
they blamed for their plight.
What Time is It?
Writing
shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Michael Burawoy and
Pavel Krotov asked "what happens to a command economy when the
party disintegrates and the centre no longer commands?" Their
answer, based on their acquaintance with the production association
Vorkuta Ugol' and its thirteen constituent mines, was that certain
tendencies within state socialist economies become intensified. They
focus on three: preexisting supply monopolies are strengthened;
lateral exchanges in the form of bartering increase; and, due to
management's overriding interest in problems of supply and barter
rather than regulating work, and "the autonomous work
organization necessary for adapting to shortages," worker
control over production expands. Because the old relations of
production remained essentially in place and because the "driving
force behind the strategies of enterprises and conglomerates [a.k.a.
production associations - LS] is the maximization
of profit through trade,"
Burawoy and Krotov characterized the transition through which the
Soviet Union was passing in its last years and which continued into
the post-Soviet era as "the rise of merchant capital." Just
as historically merchant capital tended to preserve rather than
dissolve pre-existing systems of production, so, they argue, "
in Russia the expansion of trade has conserved rather than dissolved
the Soviet enterprise."
The
notion that the Soviet enterprise might have survived the collapse of
the Soviet Union is probably less strange than that an important
feature of Europe's transition from feudalism to capitalism might
reappear in late twentieth-century Russia. Of course, their point was
"not to argue that Russia is returning to the past but to
problematize Russia's road to a radiant (capitalist) future."
That road was problematic in reality because the rule of capital did
not fill the vacuum created by the removal of central Soviet
ministerial control (Boldyrev's "ministerial feudalism").
As Burawoy noted several years later, "instead of begging the
party to organize material supplies, now enterprises begged the
central bank or local government for cheap credit." The main
"beggars" were enterprise directors who retained support of
the labor collective so long as they were effective in bartering
for/delivering the goods. Privatization was, in this sense, beside
the point. Nominal owners of their enterprises, workers in many cases
remained dependent on the strong boss (khoziain,
vozhd)
and the stronger the better. It is in this sense that the Soviet
enterprise and the paternalistic relations between managers and
workers that were fostered in the Soviet era intensified in the early
post-Soviet years.
This
is not the place to determine whether Burawoy and Krotov's historical
analogy works equally well for all sectors of the post-Soviet Russian
economy. It is possible that because the amount of capital needed for
productive investment and renovation was prohibitively high in the
case of coal and the future of the industry was so uncertain that
mining management was particularly prone to pursue subsidies and rely
on bartering. Whatever the case, the argument they make is no less
compelling when applied to newly independent Ukraine. There, arguably
even more so than in Russia, the absence of radical economic reform
left the old Soviet economic system intact and provided an enormous
incentive for workers and enterprise directors to cooperate in
extracting resources from the center.
This
united front represented the most formidable challenge to the
Ukrainian government's exercise of the prerogatives of state power.
In the case of the coal industry, that front took on a regional
dimension. Both the Independent Miners' Union of Ukraine (NPHU) and
the Donetsk City Strike Committee joined with the production
association heads and mine directors to defend the industry and the
region in which it was dominant against the Kravchuk administration
in Kyiv. Such a regionalist stance inevitably caused problems for the
NPHU with its more nationalist L'viv-Volinsk branch located in the
western part of the country, but this internal division was more than
compensated by the support of other occupational groups in the
Donbas.
The
demand for regional autonomy that emerged in the course of 1992-93
had a variety of impulses, among them linguistic and cultural. But
for the production associations and mining directors it was the
economic component - especially the right to contract directly with
Russian suppliers and customers and to import supplies duty-free -
that was of utmost importance. Such did merchant capital give "rise
to mercantilist politics, seeking protection, favorable terms of
trade, taxation and so on." In Russia, the "powerful
political lobbies [created] to uphold the system of subsidies and
credits" included the Civic Union and the Federation of
Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR). In Viktor Chernomyrdin,
himself an oil and gas executive, the "directors' lobby"
had a friend in the prime minister's office. In Ukraine, the point
man was Efim Zvyagil'skii.
Zvyagil'skii
had served from 1979 as director of the Zasiad'ko mine, transforming
it into one of the region's most profitable enterprises and making
him something of a legendary figure in Donetsk. So successful was he
in taking advantage of opportunities presented by perestroika that
Zasiad'ko's workers remained on the job during the 1991 all-Union
strike rather than jeopardize what he had gained for them in
supplies, services, and amenities. In November 1992 he left the
mine's administration to become Donetsk's mayor. Ironically,
Zasiad'ko was the first mine to be shut down by a strike in June 1993
that soon engulfed the entire region. Zvyagil'skii, elevated
temporarily to the position of deputy prime minister, was
instrumental in bringing the strike to an end to the general (though
not universal) satisfaction of strike leaders and rank-and-file
miners.
Fallout
from the strike included the resignation of Kravchuk's prime
minister, Leonid Kuchma, and his temporary replacement by none other
than Zvyagil'skii. The referenda on Kravchuk's government demanded
by strike leaders did not take place but instead both parliamentary
(Verkhovna Rada) and presidential elections were scheduled for 1994.
Opposition candidates with their economic base in the heavy and
extractive industries and their geographical base in eastern Ukraine
made significant gains in the parliamentary elections in March; the
narrow defeat of Kravchuk by Kuchma in June also represented a
victory for these same interests.
Or
so it seemed. In fact, the capture of the state by the "wild
eastern" Donbas "clan" was only partial and temporary.
Zvyagil'skii, the archetypal nomenklatura capitalist, was charged
with corruption and fled the country for Israel in 1994. Soon after
the presidential election, Kuchma replaced Donetsk personnel with
those from his native Dnipropetrovsk region in central government
positions. The next two years were characterized by a complex
reshuffling among the Donetsk elite. New commercial ventures emerged,
structured around energy trading and the buying up of metalworks
companies that had failed to pay their energy bills. These maneuvers
were accompanied by fierce struggles that included a series of
spectacular contract killings.
But
in addition to a shift of regional power away from the Donbas and
elite conflict within it, something else was happening. Within a few
years of having achieved extraordinary, even hegemonic power in the
Donbas sufficient to rock political authorities in Kyiv, the miners'
movement was fast fading into insignificance. This was mainly because
the industry it had so successfully defended was literally
crumbling. Between 1990 and 1995 as demand dwindled and the cost of
producing coal rose perilously close to import prices, output
declined from about 145 million to 65.6 million tons. Most of the
subsidies received from the state had gone into paying (back)wages
and maintaining services, so that there was little productive
investment. Even more than in the 1980s, working in the mines of the
post-independence Ukrainian Donbas comprised "a subsidized
system of 'outdoor relief' or job subsidies." It also had become
even more dangerous, with literally thousands of people killed on the
job.
In
October 1994, President Kuchma launched his "western"
policy of price and trade liberalization, strict monetary control,
and accelerated privatization. He also brought in the World Bank to
assess the condition of and prospects for the coal-mining industry.
The World Bank's recommendations for closing "unviable"
mines, selectively investing in others, and transferring resources
out of the industry and even the area were reminiscent of the
Thatcherite solution to which British miners had been subjected a
decade earlier. The romance of coal clearly was over.
The
slashing of subsidies to the mining industry, justified by the
government as an anti-inflationary measure, had the predictable
effects of mounting wage arrears and a new cycle of protests. Strikes
in February 1996 were massive, recalling those of July 1989 and 1993
but without bringing significant concessions. Protests of a more
extreme kind - including the blocking of rail and road traffic -
followed, provoking the arrest and prosecution of the leaders of the
Donetsk City Strike Committee. "From then on," writes Vlad
Mykhnenko, a scholar and native son, "wildcat strikes,
spontaneous hunger strikes and pickets became a daily occurrence in
the Donbas," accompanied more occasionally by "clashes with
police, collective suicide threats and several committed protest
suicides." The increasing desperation - and isolation - of the
miners' movement reflected the downward spiral of mine closures,
out-migration of workers, and increasing anomie among the remaining
population.
Kuchma's
1999 re-election gambits of granting "free economic zone"
status to Donetsk oblast' and establishing "priority development
territories" throughout the Donbas were quite successful in
garnering votes. But the main beneficiaries were a new class of
owners, less tied to the paternalistic practices of the old
nomenklatura
and more intricately connected to national sources of financing and
property management. Their new commercial ventures consisted of
vertically integrated, so-called financial industrial groups (FIGs)
for which "the coal industry [is] purely . . . a source of
cost-cutting opportunities for the more lucrative export-oriented
metalworking industry." It thus would appear that at least two
of the features identified by Burawoy and Krotov as characteristic of
the "merchant capital" phase of the post-Soviet Russian
economy - lateral (as opposed to vertical) exchanges, and the
maintenance of welfare functions to sustain a workforce left in
control of the production process - began to wither in Ukraine as the
twentieth century drew to a close.
If
this is so, what is in store for the miners of the Donbas and their
movement? One rather pessimistic scenario is a replication of the
situation in which, according to David Kideckel, Romanian miners have
found themselves since 1989. In his view, rather than postsocialist,
the term that best characterizes the social system and values that
have come to dominate not only Romania but a good deal of
East-Central Europe is "neo-capitalism." This he defines as
the reworking "of basic capitalist principles in new, even more
inegalitarian ways than the Western model from which it derives. Like
neo-serfdom," he continues, in the so-called "long
sixteenth century," neo-capitalism involves the re-working of a
Western prototype so as to establish a dependent hinterland in
Central and Eastern Europe. As with neo-serfdom, under neo-capitalism
the pace and extent of class differentiation exceeds the Western
experience. When capitalism was first extended east, the numerically
dominant peasants were never granted the social benefits that came to
characterise Western capitalism and no strong middle class ever
emerged. Under neo-capitalism we again see how narrow elites have
been able to appropriate public resources and prevent their
transparent, equitable distribution. The consequences for workers are
grim. Their "jobs and wages decline both absolutely and relative
to the cost of living," and they become either "degraded
supplicants or . . . alienated antagonists."
Whether
it makes more sense to conceive of the miners of the Donbas and their
collective representation as confronted by forces analogous to
fourteenth-century western Europe or sixteenth-century eastern
Europe, clearly theirs has not been an easy lot since the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Of course, much the same can be said for the
overwhelming majority of other workers. What distinguished the
miners, however, was not extraordinary privation but rather their
sustaining of an "independent" movement determined to
create a "normal life" for themselves and their families.
Now increasingly demoralized and numbering no more than 400,000, they
probably no longer have what it takes to continue to do so.
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